The United States and other nations rely on consumer choice and price competition among competing health plans to allocate resources in the health sector. A great deal of research has examined the efficiency consequences of adverse selection in health insurance markets, less attention has been devoted to other aspects of consumer choice. The nation of Switzerland offers a unique opportunity to study price competition in health insurance markets. Switzerland regulates health insurance markets with the aim of minimizing adverse selection and encouraging strong price competition. We examine consumer responses to price differences in local markets and the degree of price variation in local markets. Using both survey data and observations on local markets we obtain evidence suggesting that as the number of choices offered to individuals grow their willingness to switch plans given a set of price dispersion differences declines allowing large price differences for relatively homogeneous products to persist. We consider explanations for this phenomenon from economics and psychology.
I. Introduction
The U.S. and other nations rely on consumer choice and price competition among competing health insurance plans to allocate resources in the health sector.
There is an efficiency impulse to offer larger numbers of choices and greater variety of health insurance products. Expanded choices also carry efficiency problems in the form of adverse selection even if choices in health plans also result in price competition (Cutler and Reber, 1998) . The nation of Switzerland offers a unique opportunity to study price competition in health insurance markets. Switzerland requires all residents to have health insurance. The government regulates the terms of competition so as to encourage price competition and minimize adverse selection. This is accomplished by defining a standard benefit for the mandated individual coverage, prohibiting insurers from turning away potential enrollees, providing extensive public information on prices, and risk adjusting payments to insurers.
Households face the full price of coverage and may also purchase supplementary coverage and many do. Swiss residents all face opportunities to purchase coverage from at least 35 different sellers. In principle such a set of market arrangements might be expected to lead to active price competition. Yet Swiss health insurance markets are characterized by large and persistent price differences in local markets and little consumer switching between plans offering different prices. This has been the case even during a period of expanding choice in local health insurance markets.
These market outcomes contrast sharply from simple models of consumer behavior and competitive markets. We therefore explore several explanations of consumers' health plan switching behavior. Specifically, we focus on the response of consumers to an expanding health insurance choice set. We make use of panel data based on Swiss health insurance markets and a survey of insured individuals to explore switching behavior and consumer satisfaction with health insurance.
The paper is organized into six sections. Following the introduction, the second section describes the market for health insurance in Switzerland and reports some basic facts about the market with respect to the amount of choice, consumer mobility and price patterns. The third section explores explanations for the apparent disconnect between what the standard competitive model would lead one to expect and the observed outcomes. The fourth section describes the empirical analysis aimed at producing evidence to assess the proposed explanations. Results are reported in the fifth section. Concluding remarks are made in the final section of the paper.
II. Background
A.
Swiss Health Insurance Markets: Regulatory Framework
Switzerland, a country of 7.4 million inhabitants, is divided into 26 Cantons.
The organization of the health care system is the responsibility of individual Cantons,
The health care system is regulated by the Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal). The LAMal has been in force since 1996 after it was ratified in a popular referendum in 1994.
The main regulatory features of Swiss health insurance markets are as follows. 1) An individual mandate requires all residents to have health insurance coverage. 1 . 2) A standardized basic benefit package that is very comprehensive covering outpatient and inpatient care, and services such as nursing home care. The level of cost sharing (deductible, coinsurance of 10% up to an annual ceiling) is defined by the law and is invariant across insurers. 3) Premiums are community-1 Note that each family member must contract on an individual basis.
rated. That is, premiums can differ between health plans but, an insurer must offer uniform premium for people in the same age groups (0-18, 19-25, and >25) There is a clear-cut regulatory separation between basic statutory coverage and optional supplementary insurance. One can get basic and supplementary insurance from two different providers or from the same health insurance.
Supplementary insurance is not regulated by LAMal. Insurance Contract Law (LCA)
regulates it. In the supplementary insurance market, insurers may refuse bad risks and offer risk-rated premiums.
These features suggest that changing health insurers for basic coverage involves very low switching costs. Indeed, the basic insurance coverage is virtually identical from one health insurer to the other, and the enrollee generally can remain with the same physician or hospital. Furthermore, the actual switching procedure is simple: it requires the individual to write a letter (prototypes are downloadable from a well known website) to their health insurer. Search costs are low. All premiums are officially published every year by the Federal Office for Public Health (OFSP) and distributed to households that request them. Furthermore, the most competitive premiums can be easily found on the Internet and in newspapers.
In a health insurance market with community-rated premiums for each health plan, homogenous benefits, open enrollment and low switching costs, individuals would be expected to migrate toward the insurance plans offering the lowest premiums. Premium differences across insurance plans would be expected to be very small. The observed facts depart from these expectations. Figure 1 ). Figure 1 shows monthly price variability by Canton, the maximal difference in basic premiums for adults over 26
(for full coverage and in a single geographical cell) was 2952 Swiss francs per year or about 80% of the average. In 2004, the average gain of switching for an enrollee insured with the biggest company CSS amounted to 621 Swiss Francs over the year (which constitutes an average 20% discount).
We measure price variation by examining the mean differences across cantons of the average premium minus the minimum and the maximum minus the minimum premium. These are reported on Table 2 for the years 1997-2004. Finally, there is another line of literature that generates price dispersion based on models of price discrimination (Borenstein and Rose, 1994) . The institutional context in Swiss health insurance markets limits the applicability of the price discrimination approach.
In Switzerland during the period observed (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) the size of the choice set in local markets grew, the population aged and dissemination of information on price and quality improved. All of these changes might be expected to result in switching between health plans. During a period of expanding choice, the likelihood that there is a preferable alternative to an individual's existing health plan increases as do potential search costs. In the Swiss context, search costs may be less important than elsewhere because insurance product characteristics are closely regulated and price information is widely available. In addition one source of switching cost common in the U.S. the link between one's health plan and one's physician is essentially non-existent in Switzerland where only 8% of people are in health plans that restrict provider choice (Niepp and Zeckhauser, 1985) . In fact one recent study of consumer mobility in Europe found that switch costs are rather low in Switzerland (Laske-Alderschof et al, 2004) . Thus if there is an increase in the choice set alongside substantial price variation and relatively low search costs it is somewhat surprising to see low and declining switching rates.
The Swiss regulatory structure and the fee for service-indemnity insurance serve to reduce many aspects of service quality variation. Some quality variation no studies is a tendency towards decision avoidance by either opting for the status quo or walking away from the decision entirely (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Schwartz, 2005; Shafir, Simonson and Tversky, 1993) One set of experimental results by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) show that as the number of choices expands people will be less likely to take action and, say, make a purchase. This result is consistent with other research showing that a type of "analysis paralysis" takes hold when information and choices becomes very complex (Bawden, 2001 , Cowan, 2001 .One set of studies that is particularly relevant to the Swiss Health insurance context come from studies of 401(k) plans. Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang (2004) show that participation in 401(k) plans increases significantly when the number of funds offered decreases from 60 to less than thirty and again when fund offerings fall below 10. In the health insurance context a study by Elbel and Schlesinger (2006) plans (paid for by the government). They found that switching is more likely as the number of choices rises up to four and then it begins to decline. They also showed that, after four choices, beneficiaries put no further effort into considering health plan options. The implication is that more choice and greater complexity of choice after a point will inhibit action and reduce the quality of decisions that are made.
C. Status Quo Bias
Thaler (1980) identified a general tendency of people to exaggerate the value of an item they possess (selling price) relative to what they would value the same item if they did not own it (buying price). This has been termed the endowment effect and it stems from the idea of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Loss aversion has also been associated with an attachment to the status quo. In an environment of uncertainty and decision complexity it is hypothesized that there is a tendency to exaggerate the disadvantages of departing from current arrangements and to understate potential gains. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) The expected utility model allows for some learning about how health plans serve consumers, which might result in switching behavior. These learning effects might be expected to occur within a year or two of enrollment. Beyond that the expected utility framework would not include tenure of enrollment to explain health plan switching. The status quo bias model implies that longer tenures of enrollment should continuously reduced the likelihood of switching other things equal.
IV-Empirical Implementation
We empirically examine the roles of price, information overload and status quo bias in explaining the switching rates between insurance plans operating in individual Swiss insurance markets.
A. Overview of Analysis Strategy
Information overload may stem from the large number of competing health plans. Even if health plans can be assessed easily and quickly due to publicly available information on prices the large number of alternatives is likely to make the choice process more burdensome. In our context, status quo bias is present when enrollees prefer their current plans to lower cost alternatives of comparable quality even when tangible switching costs are low.
To examine these issues, we conduct the following specific analyses. We examine: (i) factors associated with switching of health plans/ and the intent to switch plans (ii) plan distributions of old/ new enrollees and (iii) stated reasons for being enrolled with current health plans
In our empirical analysis of plan switching, we focus on three main explanatory factors. First, we examine the monetary gains from plan switching or the influence of price differentials. Second, we assess the impact of the number of competing health plans on health plan switching. The variability in the number of choices across Cantons over time allows us to test whether more choice increases or decreases the likelihood that individuals will switch health plans. A finding that suggests that individuals facing larger numbers of alternative health plans are less likely to switch plans, other factors equal, would be most consistent with notions of information overload. That is, the number of plans is unlikely to be correlated with unmeasured quality differentials. We also control for the complexity of choice by controlling for the purchase of a supplementary insurance policy in addition to the basic package. 4 Third, we study the relationship between the duration of enrollment and switching behaviors in order to assess whether individuals stick with their current health plans though presumably superior alternatives (with respect to price) are available.
The health plan choices of new enrollees (switchers) will be compared to plan choices of those who have maintained their previous plans (non switchers).
Switchers should be relatively unencumbered by status quo bias. If the pattern of plan choices for these two groups differ significantly this would be consistent with the presence of status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988, Strombom, Buchmueller and Feldstein, 2002) .
Studying the stated reasons of enrollment in health plans at a point in time in surveys of health plan enrollees offers another window into factors that influence observed patterns of enrollment. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) have emphasized that "anchoring" or "psychological commitment" underlying status quo bias are likely to result from tradition, habit, sufficient satisfaction (as opposed to optimal choice), uncertainty toward alternatives, misperceptions or false beliefs concerning health plan characteristics. Sample surveys of Swiss health plan enrollees ask some questions related to the importance of such factors as reasons for health plan enrollment.
B. Data
We make use of two sources of data, a survey of individuals focusing on health plan choices in Switzerland and publicly reported information related to health insurance plans including premiums, number of enrollees and financial indicators (the level of reserves, and administrative costs).
The OFAS Survey
The survey that we use was conducted by the Federal Office for Social This survey provides extensive information on health plan choice at the individual level. Respondents were requested to name their current health insurance plans for the basic and supplementary health insurance separately and to define their criteria for choosing plans. The options they chose (e.g. higher deductibles, HMO) for basic insurance and the composition of the supplementary benefit package were also reported. People were asked whether they had changed any of their health insurance contracts during the four previous years (1997 -2000) and when they made changes. Consequently, switching behaviors were retrospectively reported over a four-year period. Note also that reporting of consumer choices started one year after the new health insurance policy was put into effect. In addition, information on the intent to switch in the future as well as general satisfaction with their health insurance plans was collected. Knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions towards LAMal and health plans were also investigated.
Socio-demographic characteristics as well as subjective health status were obtained in the survey. A detailed descriptive analysis of these data is available in the OFAS report (2001) and in Colombo (2001) . The data are structured as a panel dataset of switching behaviors including one observation per enrollee per year, over a four-year period. All variables except respondent gender, location, and educational attainment vary over time.
The insurer database
Our empirical models make use of information that describes health insurance markets over the period 1997-2000. This includes information on the number of enrollees (denoted n ict ) and monthly adult premiums (P ict ) that are reported at three levels: insurer (i), Canton (c) and year (t). Financial characteristics of the health plans such as the amount of reserves (r it ) and the level of administrative spending (a it ) are measured for each insurer by year.
The number of enrollees per health plan is reported at the Canton level even though there are Cantons that consist of two or three different premium regions. To address this issue we use the (unweighted) average premium per health insurer for a
Canton. In addition, the number of enrollees per health plan is not provided by type of contract even though there are discount for high deductible plans that differ from one health insurer to another. The premium for full coverage (ordinary deductible) is used as a proxy variable for the adult premium. For our purposes, this insurer information is used to compute the number of health plans by Canton-year, the number of enrollees, the average premium as well as indicators of premium variability. We make the connection between the OFAS survey and this insurer information by matching each individual health plan reported in the survey with the corresponding market information (premium, number of enrollees, reserves, administrative costs, market share) referring to the relevant year and Canton and by adding the data that we computed at the Canton level (number of operating funds, number of enrollees, premium variability).
C. Estimation

Estimation of a switching model
We estimate a health plan-switching model. We denote nt y the binary variable defined by 1 = one for markets with 55 or more choices. As we discussed above an enrollee may deal with large choice sets by creating subsets of options. This is a form of cognitive short cut that might be used to reduce information processing costs (Cowan 2001 ).
An enrollee may not be considering all options. As local markets are quite concentrated, a large number of insurers are likely to be fringe players that may not figure into the decisions of many consumers. We allow for this form of segmentation through an alternative specification that includes two plan count variables (Table 1b) . We also replaced the number of plans by the inverse of the Herfindahl index that indicates the "size equivalent" number of firms in the market (Table 1c) . Choice overload is consistent with the inverse of the Herfindahl index being negatively associated with the probability of switching.
We also treat the number of choices to be endogenous. If health plan are able to observe factors affecting switching not observable to the researcher and make entry choices accordingly then entry is endogenous. Canton fixed effects are included to capture unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. We also estimated an instrumental variables model of switching for the case of the continuous measure of plan choice. Instruments included the population of the Canton, the average income of the canton and the average premium in the canton during the prior year. nt dp) ( represents the potential gains from switching health plans. We measure nt dp) ( as the (weighted) standard deviation in health plan premiums within a Canton.
This represents the expected difference in price one would experience if the typical person switched to the mean plan in a Canton. This is one measure of potential financial gains from plan switching ( Table 2) . 5 We also estimate a model specification that includes interaction terms between the choice environment indicators, and the measure of price dispersion n dp) ( . This enables us to examine differential price response in the five choice environments. We also estimate models that include a measure of the number of new plans available to consumers during each period to allow both levels and changes in plan choice to affect switching behavior.
nt S takes on the value 1 when the individual has contracted a supplementary health insurance contract, a more complex choice situation. Furthermore, it is important to control for this variable because it might also capture the risk-selection practices that are still reported despite the existing regulation. In particular, it was highlighted that underwriting practices for supplemental policies might create an impediment to switch funds (Paolucci et al., 2007) . In order to get rid of this effect,
we run additional models excluding people with supplemental insurance.
As the impact of vector O nt on switching behavior might depend upon whether the individual has purchased supplementary insurance, the interaction between both variables will also be tested in additional models. The standard errors and significance associated with the interaction terms in non-linear models will be computed according to the approach of Ai and Norton (2003) . However, note that the idea that those with supplemental insurance face a more complicated decision assumes that the decision to purchase supplemental insurance is independent of the decision of which basic and supplemental plan to purchase. In an additional specification, we test this assumption using a bivariate probit model that jointly estimates the factors affecting the decision to switch basic health plans and to subscribe to a supplementary contract.
The structure of the data complicates the estimation of any status quo bias because the duration of enrollment is only known for the current health plan and not for any prior health plans. As a result we estimate models, where we use the declared intention to switch in the future as a dependent variable. Because attitudinal questions, such as intent to switch were only asked as prospective questions, the corresponding regressions were run a subsample of the dataset where t = 2000. In that case the vector ' n x also includes the duration of enrollment in each respondent's current health plan. nt ε is a random disturbance that is assumed to follow a logistic distribution.
Logit estimations are run on the cross section of 8608 observations. We also run random effects logit models (Greene, 2001) , thus taking into account the panel structure of the data (each individual being present during four periods).
V-Results
The main descriptive features of the survey are summarized in Table 3 Switching rates proved to be significantly higher in areas with fewer plans than in the higher choice areas over the 4-year period. A similar pattern was observed for the intent to switch outcome. The logit estimates for the plan switching models are reported on Table 4 . The first five columns of Table 4 Column four reports estimates from a model that allows consumers to view firms with a relatively large presence in the market differently from smaller fringe firms. In this model both measures are continuous. Note that both coefficient estimates are negative but only the coefficient estimate for the number of fringe firms is significantly different from zero. Finally, we include the inverse Herfindahl index as our choice set size measure in column five. The estimate coefficient for that variable is negative and significant at conventional levels.
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Two other sets of coefficient estimates in columns 1-5 are important to note.
The coefficient for the variable measuring relative price (dp) is consistently positive and significant suggesting that the larger the price differential between one's own plan and other options the more likely a consumer is to switch their health plan. The coefficient estimates while quite stable across specifications are not very precisely estimated in a number of models.
Columns 6-11 of Table 4 report a series of models that take account of potential threats to the basic specifications in columns 1-5. Column six reports the results of a re-estimation of the model in column 1 when people with supplementary coverage are dropped from the analysis file. The estimated coefficient for the number of plans remains negative and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient increased from -0.02 to -0.03. Columns 7 treat the choice set measures from columns 1 and 2 as endogenous. Using the F test proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) we show that the instruments used in our IV models are not weak. 7 The results in columns 7 show that both coefficients for the choice set size measures 6 Since there was some instability in entry involving insurers with very low levels of enrollment (see Tables 1a and 1b) in two Cantons (GR and VS) the use of the Herfindahl index allows us to test the sensitivity of our findings taking to account enrollment size. We also re-estimated the models dropping the two Cantons and the results did not change materially (estimates available upon request). 7 In order to assess the strength of the instruments that we use in type IV probit model, we estimated the corresponding IV linear probability model through 2SLS, thus being able to refer to the results that were developed for linear models (Staiger and Stock, 1997 ) (such results have not been worked out for IV probit yet). Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that the F statistics from the first stage regression should be computed. An F statistics of 10 is the threshold for the strength of instruments. In our case, F=210, suggesting that our instruments meet the criteria for strong instruments of Staiger and Stock (1997) .
continue to be negative and significantly different from zero. Columns 8 -12 offer additional sensitivity analyses. The resulting coefficient estimates for the size of the choice set remain quite stable showing a negative and significant effect of more choices on the likelihood of switching health plans. Column 8 incorporated the household size as a covariate. Column 9 indicates that when an individual holds supplemental insurance, more choice reduces the probability of switching health plans. Furthermore the bivariate probit model (joint estimation of the propensities to switch and to hold a supplementary contract) reported in column 11 suggests that we cannot reject exogeneity of supplemental coverage in the switching equation. The coefficient for supplemental coverage is never significant at conventional levels.
Column 12 shows that the number of new plans decreases the likelihood of switching (holding constant the general time trend).
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We tested whether people that switched plans paid lower premiums than those that stayed in the same plan. Our estimates show that the adjusted monthly premium for switchers was 181 SF compared to 214.18 SF for those staying with the same plan. The difference of 33.18 or 15.9% was significant at conventional levels (t=6.05). This suggests that by not switching, consumers "left money on the table". Table 5 reports results of several specifications of the logit model on a individual's intent to switch health plans. The estimated coefficients for the vector of dummy variables measuring the size of the choice set in each Canton showed a similar pattern of results to those found on Table 4 . In these models the coefficient
estimates were more precise. In general larger choice sets (above 50 choices) were associated with a significantly reduced likelihood of expressing intent to switch health plans. The estimated coefficient on the duration of enrollment in one's current funds was negative and significant in all specifications. This suggests that the longer one has been enrolled in a plan holding constant age and health status etc, the less likely one is to report an intent to switch health plans.. The results on price differences ) (dp were similar magnitude and in some cases a bit less precisely estimated than in the switching regressions of Table 4 .
We consider whether indicators of health plan "quality" affected the results on intent to switch. We included measures of administrative costs, and the size of the plan reserves. Neither of these variables had coefficient estimates that were significantly different from zero. Nor did we find any evidence that the estimated coefficients for the number of choices were affected by including these variables 9 .
We do, however, find some descriptive evidence from an analysis of switchers that is suggestive of some quality differences affecting choice behavior. Health plans with high reserves may seem more secure. Thus, it is not surprising to find that 29% of switchers have opted for funds having reserves below the required level versus 12% of non switchers (p<0.001).
We investigate the impact of choice further by modeling the intent to switch among consumers expressing dissatisfaction with their health plan. Consumers facing large numbers of health plan choices were less likely to express an intention to switch health plans even when they expressed dissatisfaction with their current health plan. Indeed, out of those who were very dissatisfied (answers 1-5 on a 1-10 scale) 33.7% intended to switch plans in areas with less than 50 choices versus 21.9% in areas with more than 50 choices (p<0.01, Chi 2 ).
9 Results are available from the authors Patterns of health plan choices among more recent choosers and the overall populations show that the distributions of plan choices differ significantly between switchers and non switchers. What are the reasons reported by enrollees for the observed patterns of enrollment? Table 9 reveals that 40% of people choose a health plan following their parents' and friends' choices, and what they see as tradition. Furthermore, as many as 25% individuals declare that they do not strive to pick the health insurance plan with the lowest premium. A substantial number of people explicitly report staying with their health plan based on habit (13.5%) or because they are satisfied with their arrangement (79%)( Table 8) .. As a test of whether people are possibly not searching for the lowest price we compare the prices obtained by those using an "agent" versus all others. We find that those using agents pay on average 9% less for coverage (p<0.05) than all other enrollees.
There appears to be considerable misunderstanding about what the basic rules of the health insurance markets are for consumers. For instance, 29% of individuals think that health plans charge different premiums to different age groups among adults for the basic package; 10% of individuals believe that sickness funds can cream skim; 15% of individuals believe that they must purchase supplementary and basic insurance from the same carrier; and 10% think that they are allowed to change health plans only when the premium rises.
VI. Concluding Observations
The Swiss market for health insurance might be one where one would find high levels of price competition and active movement among health plans by consumers interested in securing the lowest prices for a standardized basic benefit
package. Yet one observes low rates of switching persistently with high variation in premiums. These facts present a challenge to simple market models of health insurance. In this paper we raise the possibility that factors such as decision overload and status quo biases in decision making contributes to the observed behavior.
We make use of data on consumer choice in Swiss health insurance markets to explore decision overload and status quo bias as explanations for behavior in those health insurance markets. Our findings offer a mixed picture of the impact of expanded choice on price competition in Swiss health insurance markets. We explored a variety of ways of characterizing the size of the choice set. Results from the various model specifications point to a consistent finding that more choice serves to inhibit switching of health plans. In one specification we allowed consumers to respond to fringe firms differently from those that were more significant actors in the local market. There our results suggest that switching rates are largely driven by the number of "fringe" firms in the market. These results are quite consistent with the literature on 401(k) plans that show substantial effects on participation as the choice set grows to over 30 funds.
Our econometric results indicate that people with longer periods of attachment to a particular health plans were less likely to express an intention to switch plans.
Moreover, people making new health plan choices (switchers and those new to the market) chose to enroll in different health plans than those who had not switched in some time. Finally, when people are asked about why they have chosen their current plan -reasons related to habit, family tradition, and adequate performance by the health plan were noted. All of these reasons are consistent with inertia associated with status quo bias.
The results for price response show strong consumer responses to price dispersion. That is, where price dispersion is larger and the gains from switching health plans are greatest consumers are most likely to switch. These results are consistent with standard market models.
We uncover some evidence suggesting that consumers are making errors.
First, we show that consumers that switch health plan pay 15% to 16% less in health insurance premiums per month holding ceteris paribus. Second, we show that among consumers expressing dissatisfaction with their health plans those in markets with fewer choices are more likely to express intent to switch. Finally, consumers that used an agent to help them purchase insurance consistently paid significantly lower premiums. This set of results suggests that "mistakes may have been made".
One implication of these results is that expanding choice to very large numbers is likely to reduce the effectiveness of consumer decision-making which in turn may result in larger mark-ups by health insurers. This is because expanded choice will weaken the relationship between enrollment in an individual health plan and the price concessions offered to consumers (Perloff and Salop 1985) . This is consistent with our finding on the link between number of choices and variation in prices.
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